Wikileaks Cable completo sobre rescate de soldados en el VRAE en Ingles

D: 223894

Date: 2009-09-04 21:01:00

Origin: 09LIMA1309

Source: Embassy Lima

Classification: CONFIDENTIAL

Dunno: 09LIMA1299

Destination: VZCZCXYZ0000

PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPE #1309/01 2472101

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

P 042101Z SEP 09

FM AMEMBASSY LIMA

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1176

INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 0010

RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 0018

RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 8517

RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4093

RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1496

RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ SEP MONTEVIDEO 9816

RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 0011

RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0009

RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC

RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 001309

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2019

TAGS: PTER, SNAR, SOCI, PGOV, MOPS, PE

SUBJECT: VRAE: GOP MOUNTS RESCUE OP FOR STRANDED SOLDIERS

REF: LIMA 1299

Classified By: DCM James Nealon for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary: At approximately 1100 hrs on September 4,

Peruvian armed forces successfully overcame small arms fire,

weather delays and capability limitations, and rescued five

wounded soldiers stranded in the aftermath of the September 2

Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL) attack on a Peruvian air

force (FAP) helicopter (ref). The attack and rescue are

perceived as symbolically significant and government troops

remain in the area and continue to battle SL forces. Major

challenges include the areas rough terrain, altitude, and

topography, in addition to security forces lack of

intelligence, logistical lift and proper equipment. The US

provided only modest support to the rescue operation, despite

prominent political leaders public call for US assistance.

End summary.

2. (C) Peruvian armed forces successfully overcame daunting

obstacles, including intense small arms fire, to rescue by

air five wounded soldiers trapped in the wake of the

September 2 SL skirmish and subsequent attack on a Peruvian

air force (FAP) helicopter. The bodies of the three KIA crew

members still remain at the site, along with the rest of the

patrol (reportedly around 20-30). Military contacts indicate

that an additional group of 50-odd combat soldiers arrived

over land from Huachocolpa on September 3 to reinforce the

besieged original patrol.

Observations

-------------

3. (C) The September 2 latest attack is significant: after

several previous attempts, this is the first time since 1999

SL has downed a helicopter. Besides the high-profile blow,

the importance of the successful rescue loomed large, since

experts acknowledge that a failure could have had a

devastating impact on soldiers morale. Authorities are

uncertain on how the soldiers continued engagement will

proceed given the troops bare-bones logistical abilities

against an enemy who is more used to the areas rough

terrain, high altitude, and topography. Dense jungle make it

nearly impossible to spot SL columns locations at any given

moment. Elevations of around 12,000 feet makes the use of

heavy armored helicopters unfeasible, even if the FAP had

them. The FAP is understandably wary of sending helicopters

back to the same location for fear of additional attacks, and

dropping special forces onto a neighboring hill could mean

several days of trekking over steep terrain to get to the

site of the attack.

4. (C) Embassy military and security experts are in contact

with their Peruvian counterparts, but operational security

(OPSEC) for the ongoing mission is tight. For this reason the

following information cannot be confirmed.

-- Since the original patrol was reinforced by another fifty

fresh troops (infantry or special forces), it suggests that

more ground reinforcements could be inserted to fight the SL

if needed.

-- The logic to remain engaged with the SL in this

strategically unimportant area only makes military sense if

the security forces are sufficiently strong enough to inflict

meaningful damage on the SL.

-- A knowledgeable analyst cautioned that SL could be

diverting security forces attention away from its true next

target to some place else in the VRAE.

-- The medical evacuation of the five WIA soldiers was

accomplished via helicopter -- a dangerous proposition since

there is still thought to be up to four SL elements holding

the high ground above the government soldiers.

-- It is unclear if SL was able to recover the two

crew-served weapons (7.62 mm MAGs) and belts of ammunition

that were onboard the downed MI-17 helicopter.

-- We understand that the FAP and Army (EP) currently have no

more than five mission-capable MI-17s. None of these craft

are armored or configured as gunships.

-- Should the GOP security forces decide to persist in the

area, they will have to locate the enemy and then "shoot,

move and communicate" to prevent any other helicopters from

being shot down.

Political Ramifications:

------------------------

5. (C) Prominent political leaders publicly called for the

US to assist in the rescue operation. (Embassy assistance to

the rescue operation was limited to providing appropriate

recent satellite imagery, though the density of triple-canopy

jungle makes this imagery of limited use.) Police Director

General Manuel Hidalgo also inquired about the possible use

of NAS helicopters for the evacuation. We informed him that

altitude, weather and hostile conditions precluded the use of

NAS UH-IIs for the mission. APRA Congressman (and former

President of Congress and the Congressional Defense

Committee) Luis Gonzales Posada remarked on September 3 that

Peru was being "abandoned by international cooperation" in

its fight against terrorism and narcotrafficking. Earlier in

the week, Defense Minister Rafael Rey made a similar remark,

saying it was a shame Peru did not have U.S. assistance in

the VRAE. Rey later backed off from some of his statements

in light of the Colombia DCA controversy that took place at

the Bariloche UNASUR meeting of presidents.

Comment: Another Wake-up Call?

------------------------------

6. (C) This incident illustrates once again the Peruvian

militarys shortcomings in confronting the remnants of

Sendero Luminoso in the VRAE. To date, there has been little

indication that the GOP can be serious about investing

greater resources in the VRAE. The immediate

finger-pointing, whether aimed at us or at Peruvian political

actors, hampers the political debate and leaves the issues

unresolved until the next bloody skirmish. We have attempted

to assist the GOP in identifying and defining workable

solutions, and will continue to do so. End Comment.

MCKINLEY